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I. INTRODUCTION
Employers commonly set out workplace policies and guidelines
in employee handbooks, personnel manuals, and other unilaterally-
created policy statements. The primary function of these documents is
to convey information concerning personnel policies such as expected
employee behavior, information on pay and benefits, and disciplinary
Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty, & Bennett Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law
School. This article is adapted, in part, from an earlier paper that commented on a draft of the
Restatement Matthew W. Finkin et al., Working Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed
Restatement of Employment Law: Employment Contracts: Termination, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 93, 119 (2009).
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procedures.' Traditionally, these documents were considered
unenforceable as gratuitous statements of policy.2 Beginning in the
1980s, however, courts increasingly began to construe such statements
as creating binding employer obligations in appropriate
circumstances.3
Sections 2.05 and 2.06 of the recently adopted Restatement of
Employment Law discuss when employer policy statements should be
considered binding and when they may be modified or withdrawn.!
Section 2.05, for example, accurately describes the two competing
legal theories that jurisdictions use to enforce employee handbooks.
But, this tells only half of the employee handbook story. The
Restatement fails to come to grips with the practical reality that
American employers more recently have utilized disclaimers and
handbook modifications in a manner that returns employee
handbooks back into the realm of unenforceable policy statements.
Unfortunately, the Restatement appears to endorse the legal
principles that have made this second half of the story possible.
II. RESTATEMENT SECTION 2.05
A. Restatement Position and Comment
Restatement Section 2.05, Binding Employer Policy Statements,
provides:
Policy statements by an employer in documents such as
employee manuals, personnel handbooks, and employer policy
directives that are provided or made accessible to employees, whether
by physical or electronic means, and that, reasonably read in context,
establish limits on the employer's power to terminate the
employment relationship, are binding on the employer until modified
or revoked (as provided in § 2.06).
1. See Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13
INDUS. REL. L. J. 326, 335 (1992).
2. See, e.g., Johnson v. Nat'l Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779, 782 (Kan. 1976) ("It [the
employee handbook] was only a unilateral expression of company policy and procedures. Its
terms were not bargained for by the parties and any benefits conferred by it were mere
gratuities. Certainly, no meeting of the minds was evidenced by the defendant's unilateral act of
publishing company policy.").
3. See Befort, supra note 1, at 335.
4. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW §§ 2.05, 2.06 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
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Restatement section 2.05 adopts the position that policy
statements made in such documents as employee manuals, personnel
handbooks, and employment-policy directives that establish limits on
the employer's power to terminate the employment relationship "are
binding on the employer until modified or revoked."'
The reporters' notes explain that "[t]his Section adopts the
position of the clear majority of U.S. jurisdictions ... that unilateral
employer statements can, in appropriate circumstances, establish
binding employer obligations."' The comment asserts that "some"
courts reach this result by applying unilateral contract analysis.' The
comment criticizes this approach as "a conceptually awkward fit" in
that employees rarely are aware of the content of these statements
when they accept or continue employment.' The comment goes on to
state that "other courts, and this Restatement, rest the binding effect
of unilateral employer statements on general estoppel principles."'
Making an analogy to "administrative agency estoppel," the comment
contends that when an employer announces unilateral statements
intending to govern personnel policy matters, those statements should
be binding on the employer until properly modified or revoked."o
The comment states that unilateral employer statements should
be "reasonably read in context" to determine whether they have a
binding effect." The comment references three factors that should be
considered in this regard: the presence of a prominent disclaimer, the
mode by which the employer disseminates the document, and
whether the particular workplace culture relies on bilateral
agreements." 12
B. Critique
1. The Binding Nature of Employer Policy Statements
Although some jurisdictions, such as Georgia, Florida, and
Missouri, continue to view handbook pronouncements as mere
5. Id. § 2.05.
6. Id. § 2.05 reporters' notes, cmt. a.




11. Id. § 2.05 cmt. c.
12. Id.
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statements of policy without any enforceable effect,13 the comment is
clearly correct in asserting that the vast majority of U.S. jurisdictions
recognize that provisions in employee handbooks and similar
documents can be binding on the employer even though promulgated
unilaterally.14 A few jurisdictions have suggested that unilaterally
promulgated policy statements may be enforceable in dicta but have
not addressed the issue squarely." Finally, New Hampshire has only
found handbook provisions to be binding when collateral
employment benefits are promised; it is unclear if a promise of job
security is enforceable on the same grounds."
2. Rationale for Enforcement
Although the comment states that "some" courts employ
unilateral contract principles in analyzing handbook statements,17 it is
clear that the vast majority of courts that have recognized the
enforceability of handbook provisions have done so on the basis of
unilateral contract theory.1 In general, an implied-in-fact unilateral
contract can be established if: "(1) [the] handbook is sufficiently
definite in its terms to create an offer; (2) the handbook is
communicated to and accepted by the employees so as to constitute
acceptance; and (3) the employee provides consideration."'9 Most
courts utilizing unilateral contract principles find that an employee's
continued work performance after receiving a handbook or similar
policy statement provides both the requisite acceptance and
13. See Quaker Oats Co. v. Jewell, 818 So.2d 574, 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Doss v.
City of Savannah, 660 S.E.2d 457, 667 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Mo. 1988). In addition, Montana has created a claim for wrongful
discharge by statute which expressly preempts any claim for discharge that may arise from
"express or implied contract." MONT. CODE. ANN. § 39-2-913 (2015).
14. See Jason A. Walters, The Brooklyn Bridge is Falling Down: Unilateral Contract
Modification and the Sole Requirement of the Offeree's Assent, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 375, 379
(2002).
15. See, e.g., McCalment v. Eli Lilly & Co., 860 N.E.2d 884, 891 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(declining to decide the issue whether handbook provisions can modify the at-will rule); Neri v.
Ross-Simons, Inc., 897 A.2d 42, 47-48 (R.I. 2006) (stating that even if it were to recognize the
enforceability of handbook statements, the presence of a disclaimer foreclosed the possibility of
such a claim's success in that instance).
16. See Butler v. Walker Power, Inc., 629 A.2d 91, 93 (N. H. 1993).
17. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 2.05 cmt. b.
18. See Bruce Yoder, How Reasonable is "Reasonable"? The Search for a Satisfactory
Approach to Employment Handbooks, 57 DUKE L. J. 1517, 1523 (2008); see, e.g., Asmus v. Pac.
Bell, 999 P.2d 71 (Cal. 2000); Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 662 A.2d 89
(Conn. 1995); Pine River State Bank v. Metille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Woolley v.
Hoffman- La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1982).
19. Phipps v. IASD Health Servs. Corp., 558 N.W.2d 198, 203 (Iowa 1997).
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consideration to support a binding unilateral contract.20
In contrast, only a handful of states rely on estoppel principles in
determining the binding nature of employer policy statements. 21 The
Michigan Supreme Court has been the most influential proponent of
this view with two landmark decisions: Toussaint v. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Michigan,' and Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co. 23 As
the Michigan court summarized in Bankey, "written personnel
policies are not enforceable because they have been 'offered and
accepted' as a unilateral contract; rather, their enforceability arising
from the benefit the employer derives by establishing such policies."2 4
Most states that use promissory estoppel analysis do so as a co-
existing alternative to unilateral contract analysis, thus providing two
possible justifications for enforcing unilateral policy statements.
The Restatement's endorsement of the estoppel rationale comes
with some obvious advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side,
the estoppel approach arguably entails a more purposeful inquiry into
the policy reasons underlying the enforcement of handbook
statements. As I summarized in an earlier article:
The promissory estoppel analysis offers two advantages in the
handbook arena. First, promissory estoppel appropriately focuses
on the legitimacy of employee expectations rather than on the
somewhat fictionalized search for the contract law technicalities of
acceptance and consideration. Second, promissory estoppel theory
goes beyond the promise principle to consider explicitly the
underlying equities or "injustice"' of enforcement or
nonenforcement. While the equity factor may well drive many of
the handbook cases under either theory, promissory estoppel
analysis does so openly and directly instead of covertly through a
manipulation of other factors. 26
The estoppel approach also recognizes that handbooks are not
merely gratuitous statements, but that employers purposely
disseminate such documents for the purpose of securing tangible
20. See, e.g., Pine River State Bank, 333 N.W.2d at 629.
21. See Befort, supra note 1, at 344.
22. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
23. 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1989).
24. Id. at 119-20.
25. See, e.g., Cont'1 Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987); Russell v. Bd. of
Cty. Commr's, 952 P.2d 492 (Okla. 1997); Taylor v. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 466 (Vt. 1994),
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984).
26. Befort, supra note 1, at 344 (citations omitted). In that article, I proposed that the
enforceability of employee handbooks should be determined by a three-prong test: 1) does the
handbook language contain a specific promise of job security or fair procedures, 2) that
engenders reasonable employee expectations, and 3) serves to provide a substantial benefit to
the employer? See id at 374-75.
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benefits. These benefits may include the following:
1) Promoting employee adherence to a desired code of
workplace conduct;
2) Implementing a uniform personnel code which is easy to
administer;
3) Avoiding unionization;
4) Boosting employee morale; and
5) Creating a favorable image in the community.27
On the other hand, the Restatement's choice comes with three
arguable disadvantages. First, the Restatement's adoption of the
estoppel rationale does not simply restate or clarify the law; it instead
seeks to alter existing law in most jurisdictions. Since the vast
majority of U.S. jurisdictions currently utilize unilateral contract
principles in evaluating the enforceability of employer policy
statements, the Restatement's rejection of that theory represents a
significant departure from the existing legal landscape. A second
potential drawback is that traditional promissory estoppel theory
requires a showing of individualized reliance, and some courts have
refused to enforce handbook promises where the employee in
question has failed to prove detrimental reliance on specific
handbook terms.28 This requirement imposes difficult proof problems
and could result in inconsistent levels of job security among
employees covered by the same policy language. This drawback could
be minimized by adopting the approach of those courts that dispense
with the requirement of individual reliance in favor of a rule requiring
a showing only of objectively established group reliance.2
The comment's approving reference to notions of
"administrative agency estoppel" may be consistent with the latter
approach,' but, as discussed below,3 ' this concept suffers from other
27. Id. at 337-38.
28. See, e.g., Russell, 952 P.2d at 503-04 (Okla. 1997) (finding a material fact dispute as to
whether plaintiff established element of detrimental reliance on provision in personnel manual);
Stewart, 762 P.2d at 1146 (Wash. 1988) (finding that plaintiff failed to submit proof of individual
reliance on handbook layoff policies).
29. See, e.g., Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 443 N.W. 2d 112, 119 (Mich. 1989) (stating that
handbook promises should be enforced if they benefit an employer by encouraging employee
expectations that lead to an "environment conducive to collective productivity").
30. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 2.05 cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 2015).
31. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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infirmities. Finally, promissory estoppel may provide a very limited
remedy. Under traditional promissory estoppel analysis, a successful
plaintiff is entitled only to recover damages incurred in past reliance
as opposed to the anticipated value of future benefits.32
3. Contextual Construction - The Particular Importance of
Disclaimers
The comment to section 2.05 states that certain contextual
factors may influence the enforceability of employer statements. As
an example, the comment points out that the mode of an employer's
dissemination of a policy statement may inform the enforceability
determination.3 3 As the reporters' notes indicate, "some courts deny
[enforcement] to statements distributed only to supervisors."3
In addition, courts generally will enforce only statements that are
"definite in form" as opposed to mere "general statements of
policy."" As the Illinois Supreme Court has stated, a handbook
statement, in order to be deemed an offer for unilateral contract
purposes, "must contain a promise clear enough that an employee
would reasonably believe that an offer has been made."3
The most important contextual consideration concerns the
impact of disclaimers. Although they come in many different formats,
the typical disclaimer is a provision within a policy document that
states that nothing contained in the document should be construed as
a contract and that the employment relationship may be terminated
on an at-will basis.
A substantial majority of U.S. courts find that a clearly stated
disclaimer will serve to bar the enforcement of employer policy
statements.3 ' This is particularly true in those jurisdictions employing
unilateral contract analysis where a disclaimer generally is found to
32. See, e.g., Grouse v. Grp. Health Med. Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981); Goff-
Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 588 N.W.2d 798 (Neb. 1999).
33. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 2.05 cmt. c.
34. Id. § 2.05 reporters' notes, cmt. a.
35. Pine River State Bank v. Metille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626, 630 (Minn. 1983); see also
Aberle v. City of Aberdeen, 718 N.W.2d 615, 621-22 (S.D. 2006) (ruling that a handbook can
create an implied contract only if it embodies the clear intention of the employer to surrender
its usual at-will prerogative).
36. Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ill. 1987).
37. See Michael A. Chagares, Utilization of the Disclaimer as an Effective Means to Define
the Employment Relationship, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 365, 386 (1989).
38. See Yoder, supra note 18, at 1535; see, e.g., Massey v. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp.,
917 So. 2d 833, 841 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005); Boulton v. Inst. of Int'l Educ., 808 A.2d 499, 505
(D.C. 2002); Phipps v. IASD, 558 N.W.2d 198, 204 (Iowa 1997).
2017] 313
314 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 21:307
preclude contract formation as a matter of law.3 9 In these jurisdictions,
the disclaimer effectively negates any notion that a policy statement
constitutes an offer such that the court can dispose of the employee's
claim without the need for jury deliberation.40
There are, however, some exceptions to this general rule. First,
courts generally will submit the issue of enforceability to a jury if the
language of the disclaimer is ambiguous or if its placement is not
conspicuous.41 Indeed, a few court decisions have gone so far as to
find ambiguous disclaimers to be ineffective as a matter of law.42
Second, some courts find an inherent ambiguity in handbooks that
contain both specific promises of job security and a disclaimer that
attempts to negate the enforcement or such promises. 43 The outcome
in these cases is for the ambiguity to be resolved by a jury rather than
the court."
Those jurisdictions that utilize promissory estoppel principles
apply a somewhat different analysis. In many instances, courts in
these jurisdictions find as a matter of law that a clear and conspicuous
disclaimer negates the existence of a promise on which employees
reasonably may rely.45 In other instances, however, courts applying
estoppel theory find that a disclaimer does not automatically
foreclose enforceability, but instead is just one piece of evidence for a
jury to consider in determining whether a policy statement, taken as a
whole, reasonably induced the work force to rely on its terms.4 The
Colorado Court of Appeals in Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Electric
39. See, e.g., Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 401-02 (Utah 1998); Bouwens
v. Centrilift, 974 P.2d 941, 946-47 (Wyo. 1999).
40. See Befort, supra note 1, at 348-49; Yoder, supra note 18, at 1535.
41. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Host Int'l, Inc., 757 N.E.2d 267, 271-72 (Mass. Ct. App. 2001);
Williams v. Precisions Coil, Inc., 459 S.E.2d 329, 341-42 (W.Va. 1995); Clay v. Horton Mfg. Co.
Inc., 493 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Wis. App. 1992).
42. See, e.g., Jones v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 788 (Alaska 1989); Hicks
v. Methodist Med. Ctr., 593 N.E.2d 119, 121-22 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992); Nicosia v. Wakefern Food
Corp., 643A.2d 554, 561-62 (N.J. 1994).
43. See, e.g., Guz v. Betchel Nat'l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1103-04 (Cal. 2000) (finding a question
of fact with respect to the effect of a disclaimer "where other provisions in the employer's
personnel documents themselves suggest limits on the employer's termination rights"); Fleming
v. Borden, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 589, 598 (S.C. 1994) (ruling that a disclaimer is merely one factor in
ascertaining whether handbook as a whole conveys enforceable promises); Dillon v. Champion
Jogbra, Inc., 819 A.2d 703, 707 (Vt. 2002) (finding ambiguity despite a disclaimer where
language of the handbook and employer action indicated intent to create a contract).
44. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1103-04; Fleming, 450 S.E.2d at 598; Dillon, 819 A.2d at 707.
45. See, e.g., Lytle v. Malady, 579 N.W.2d 906,911-12 (Mich. 1998).
46. See e.g., Allabashi v. Lincoln Nat'l Sales Corp., 824 P.2d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991);
Haselrig v. Pub. Storage Inc., 585 A.2d 294 (Md. Ct. App. 1991); McDonald v. Mobil Coal
Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866, 869-70 (Wyo. 1990).
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Ass'n,47 for example, ruled that an employee is entitled to enforce a
handbook promise, notwithstanding the presence of a disclaimer, if it
can be shown that:
[t]he employer should reasonably have expected the employee to
consider the manual as a commitment from the employer to follow
the termination procedures, that the employee reasonably relied
upon the termination procedures to his detriment, and that injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the termination
procedures.
The task of the jury in these cases, accordingly, is not to resolve
ambiguous policy language, but to determine the reasonable
expectations that such language generates.49
Section 2.05 does not specifically address how much weight
courts should give to disclaimers. The comment states that the
presence of a prominent disclaimer may indicate that a policy
statement is only "hortatory" in nature, but that the broader context
of the statement and other employer policies may indicate
otherwise.0 This sheds little light on such an important issue. Under
prevailing handbook jurisprudence, the presence of a clear and
conspicuous disclaimer will negate the enforcement of most employer
policy statements." Not surprisingly, American employers almost
universally insure that any employee handbook they issue is
accompanied by a disclaimer. Given that reality, it is inadequate for
section 2.05 to proclaim that employer policy statements generally are
binding when, in fact, they are not.
Significantly, many commentators maintain that employment
policy is ill-served by a legal rule that gives preclusive effect to
boilerplate disclaimers without regard to the actual expectations
created by employer policy statements.52 Having endorsed an estoppel
approach to handbook enforcement, one might hope that section 2.05
similarly would support an estoppel approach to disclaimer analysis.
If so, one would assume that the presence of a disclaimer would not
47. 765 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1988).
48. Id. at 624.
49. See Befort, supra note 1, at 366-67.
50. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 2.05 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
51. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
52. See e.g., Befort, supra note 1, at 372-76; Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are
Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does It Matter, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 19-20 (2002);
Matthew W. Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work: Employer Policies and Contract Law, 1986
Wis. L. REV. 733, 751-52; Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of
Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1082,
1106-07 (1984); Yoder, supra note 18, at 1535-36.
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automatically defeat handbook enforcement - the usual unilateral
contract result - but instead would serve only as a factor in
determining the appropriateness of collective reliance on handbook
statements." This, of course, would entail a more fact-intensive
examination that in many instances would not be appropriate for
resolution via summary judgment. It is likely, however, that section
2.05's preference for "administrative agency estoppel," as opposed to
promissory estoppel, per se, does not contemplate such an approach.
III. RESTATEMENT SECTION 2.06
A. Restatement Position and Comment
Restatement section 2.06, Modification or Revocation of Binding
Employer Policy Statements, provides:
(a) An employer may prospectively modify or revoke its binding
policy statements if it provides reasonable advance notice of, or
reasonably makes accessible, the modified statement or revocation
to the affected employees.
(b) Modifications and revocations apply to all employees hired,
and all employees who continue working, after the notice is given
and the modification or revocation becomes effective.
(c) Modifications and revocations cannot adversely affect vested
or accrued employee rights that may have been created by the
statement, an agreement based on the statement (covered by §
2.03), or reasonable detrimental reliance on a promise in the
statement (covered by § 2.02, Comment c).
Section 2.06 of the Restatement adopts the position that an
employer may modify or revoke a previously issued and binding
policy statement by providing reasonable notice of the change so long
as such action does not adversely affect vested or accrued employee
rights.54
The comment to section 2.06 notes that the courts currently are
split with respect to an employer's ability to modify existing policy
statements. The comment states that
[a] substantial number of courts have held that an employee who
continues to work for the employer after receiving proper notice of
a modification or revocation of a unilateral employer statement
that makes a personnel policy less advantageous to the employees
than the original statement are deemed to have "'accepted"' the
53. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
54. Restatement of Emp't Law § 2.06.
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change."
In contrast, the comment notes that "[a] smaller number of
courts have held that a changed personnel policy covers only those
incumbent employees who have expressly agreed to the change.""
The Restatement endorses the former view, asserting that an employer
should be entitled to alter existing documents by providing the same
or substantially equivalent notice as was provided when the prior
documents were disseminated.7 In terms of rationale, the comment
states that "[i]t is not reasonable to assume that an employer intended
permanently to circumscribe its operational policies through such
non-bargained-for promulgations."" In addition, the comment
contends that permitting employers to alter policy statements only by
means of a bilateral agreement is contrary to the equitable estoppel
grounds that the Restatement recognizes as the basis for enforcing
such statements.5 9
B. Critique
1. Two Conflicting Views
a. Majority View
According to the scholarly commentary, a clear majority of states
find that an employer may modify or revoke previously issued policy
statements on a unilateral basis.6o These jurisdictions take the position
that an employee's continued work performance after receiving
notice of the change constitutes acceptance and consideration just as
it did for the previously issued document. In essence, these courts
adopt a "reverse" unilateral contract analysis, concluding that since
the employer created the binding document unilaterally, it may also
terminate or modify the resulting obligation in the same manner.62 As
summarized by the Supreme Court of California, requiring actual
55. Id. § 2.06 cmt. e.
56. Id.
57. See id. § 2.06 cmt. d.
58. Id. § 2.06 cmt. a.
59. See id. § 2.06 cmt. e.
60. See Brian T. Kohn, Contracts of Convenience: Preventing Employers from Unilaterally
Modifying Promises Made in Employee Handbooks, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 819 (2003);
Walters, supra note 14, at 387; Yoder, supra note 18, at 1527.
61. See, e.g., Asmus v. Pac. Bell 999 P.2d 71, 78 (Cal. 2000); Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power
Coop., 431 N.W.2d 296, 298 (N.D. 1988); Fleming v. Borden, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 589, 595 (S.C.
1994); Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc, 972 P.2d 395, 401 (Utah 1998).
62. See Befort, supra note 1, at 357-58; Kohn, supra note 60, at 819.
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assent "would incorrectly impose a bilateral principle on the
unilateral relationship, leaving the employer unable to manage its
business, impairing essential managerial flexibility, and causing undue
deterioration of traditional employment principles."63
Courts applying the majority rule generally place two limits on
an employer's ability to unilaterally withdraw or alter previously-
issued policy statements. First, these courts require the employer to
provide affected employees with reasonable notice of the alteration.4
There is, however, no well-accepted understanding of what type of
notice is "reasonable." Some courts find that constructive notice is
sufficient, such that the dissemination of a revised handbook itself
constitutes reasonable notice.65 Some other courts require more in the
way of actual notice that specifically references the key alterations.6
Meanwhile, a few courts, most notably the California Supreme Court
in Ausmus v. Pacific Bell, appear to require a period of advance
61
notice before an announced alteration may take effect.
As a purported second limitation, these courts frequently state
that an employer's modification of a previously existing policy may
not interfere with any rights that may have vested under the prior
policy.6 This rule occasionally has been invoked to bar an employer
from refusing to provide a benefit, such as accrued vacation pay, that
an employee has fully earned under a pre-existing policy.69 But, this
notion has no real meaning with respect to unilateral policy
statements that provide for some limitation on the at-will dismissal
presumption. Since the majority rule recognizes an employer's right
to rescind such policies on a unilateral basis, such employment
security rights never truly vest.70 In practical effect, accordingly, the
majority view forecloses any possibility of a claim based on the
63. Asmus, 999 P.2d at 78 (citing Demasse v. ITT Corp, 984 P.2d 1138, 1155 (Ariz. 1999)
(J. Jones, dissenting)).
64. See Walters, supra note 14, at 387-88; Yoder, supra note 18, at 1533.
65, See, e.g., Elliott v. Bd. of Trs. of Montgomery Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 655 A.2d 46, 51-52
(Md. Ct. Spec. App.1995) (finding that employer's dissemination of amended policies and
procedures manual without explanation constituted sufficient notice).
66. See e.g., Fleming v. Borden, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 589, 595-95 (S.C. 1994) (requiring that
employer provide actual notice to employee of modification of previously binding handbook).
67. Asmus 999 P.2d at 80 (finding that employer that gave five months notice before
revised policy took effect provided employees with "ample advance notice").
68. See, e.g., id. at 76.
69. See e.g., Amoco Fabrics & Fiber Co., Inc. v. Hilson, 669 So. 2d 832, 835 (Ala. 1995)
(vacation pay); Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 765, 777 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (severance
pay).
70. See Asmus, 999 P.2d at 79 (stating that "no court has treated an employment security
policy as a vested interest for private sector employees").
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vesting of a promise of job security.
b. Minority View
The comment to section 2.06 is correct in stating that a smaller
number of courts take a more restrictive view and find that an
employer may modify the terms of a binding unilateral policy only
upon obtaining the mutual assent of covered employees and/or by
providing additional consideration.7 1 These courts reason that since
the employee already possesses contractual rights flowing from the
initial handbook, an employer's attempted modification that seeks to
circumscribe those rights should be effective only if it satisfies the
elements of a new bilateral contract.72 These courts contend that an
employee's continuing to work is insufficient consideration in this
context since the requisite consideration should benefit the employee
who is relinquishing rights rather than the employer who is gaining
rights." They find that the majority rule, in contrast, places an
employee in an impossible bind. As the Connecticut Supreme Court
has stated: "[t]he employee's only choices [when presented with a
modified document] would be to resign or to continue working, either
of which would result in the loss of the very right at issue - that is, the
loss of the right to retain employment until terminated for cause."74
2. Scholarly Commentary
The scholarly commentary rather strongly disfavors the majority
view. The range of opinion expressed by the academy on this issue
falls along the following spectrum: 1) those that favor the minority
view as best embodying pertinent contract law principles;" 2) those
71. See, e.g., Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1144 (Ariz. 1999) (requiring mutual
assent and additional consideration); Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 662 A.2d
89, 99 (Conn. 1995) (requiring mutual assent); Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 708 N.E.2d 1140,
1144-45 (Ill. 1999) (requiring additional consideration); Brodie v. Gen. Chem'I Corp., 934 P.2d
1263, 1268 (Wyo. 1997) (requiring mutual assent and additional consideration).
72. See Thompson v. King's Entm't Co., 674 F. Supp. 1194, 1198 (E.D. Va. 1987); Befort,
supra note 1, at 360.
73. See, e.g., Doyle, 708 N.E.2d at 1145 (stating "[b]ecause the defendant was seeking to
reduce the rights enjoyed by the plaintiffs under the employee handbook, it was the defendant,
and not the plaintiffs, who would properly be required to provide consideration for the
modification").
74. Torosyan, 662 A.2d at 99.
75. See Kohn, supra note 60, at 804-05; Richard J. Pratt, Unilateral Modification of
Employment Handbooks: Further Encroachments on the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 197, 221 (1990); Stephen Carey Sullivan, Unilateral Modification of Employee
Handbooks: A Contractual Analysis, 5 REGENT U. L. REv. 261, 293 (1995).
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that believe that modification attempts should be evaluated under the
basic estoppel principle of whether the modified document
nonetheless generates reasonable employee expectations;76 and 3)
those that believe that an employer should be able to modify or
revoke policy statements with a reasonable period of advance notice
ranging from a minimum of one week to a maximum of three months
for those revisions that seek to extinguish a previously existing
promise of job security.77
3. Restatement Rationale
Section 2.06 adopts the prevailing majority view and recognizes
an employer's authority to repudiate prior policy statement
pronouncements on a unilateral basis.7 ' The only limitation on this
authority is that the employer must provide reasonable advance
notice to effected employees in at least the same or substantially
equivalent manner that gave rise to the earlier obligation.7 ' Thus, an
employer that distributed its initial policy manual without explanation
would be free to do the same in revoking or modifying
representations contained in the earlier document.
The comment to section 2.06 offers two justifications for the
adoption of this position. First, the comment states that "[r]equiring
employees expressly to agree to changes in employer statements
would be unworkable for companies with large workforces."a Two
commentators have offered competing views on this issue. Bruce
Yoder, in a 2008 article, provides general support for the justification
offered by the comment in the following passage:
Perhaps the most persuasive argument against requiring additional
consideration is that proscribing unilateral modification of
handbooks would be an unwieldy and impractical policy for
employers to implement. Such a rule would become a logistical
nightmare, as a company manual "could never be changed short of
successful renegotiation with each employee who worked while the
policy was in effect." Problems with holdouts, dates of hiring, and
various manuals that had been previously issued would mean that
employers could have drastically different obligations to many
different employees.8 '
76. See Befort, supra note 1, at 377.
77. See Yoder, supra note 18, at 1540-42.
78. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 2.06.
79. See id. § 2.06 cmt. d.
80. Id. § 2.06 cmt. e.
81. Yoder, supra note 18, at 1531 (quoting Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 443 N.W.2d 112,
120 (Mich. 1989)).
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In contrast, Professor Matthew Finkin argues that the concern
that an employer may end up with potentially different obligations
owing to different employees is over-stated. He writes:
[E]mployers seem to have no difficulty today in freezing their
guaranteed benefits pension plans vis-A-vis incumbent workers and
hiring new workers under defined contribution plans (sometimes
employer non-contributory) or affording them no pension benefits
at all. Nor are employers apparently troubled by having the same
work done in the same workplace by both regular and agency
workers who work side-by-side under vastly different wage and
benefits policies. Uniformity of treatment does not seem to be of
much concern to employers in these cases. It is never explained [in
the draft Restatement] why uniformity of treatment should drive in
the opposite direction when it comes to job security.8
The comment also contends that requiring employers to obtain a
bilateral agreement to modify or revoke a unilateral policy statement
is contrary to the equitable estoppel basis for enforcing such
statements. Some support for this view is provided by the analysis of
the Michigan Supreme Court in Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting
Company." In that case, the court considered a certified question
asking whether an employer could replace a discharge-for-cause
policy statement with an at-will policy on a unilateral basis." In
addressing this issue, the court surveyed the various theoretical bases
for enforcing policy statements and concluded that enforceability in
Michigan "arises from the benefit the employer derives by
establishing such policies," namely by fostering employee
expectations that "promote an environment conducive to collective
productivity."8 The court, applying this estoppel-like standard, found
that when an employer revokes an earlier policy by eliminating
promissory language, "the employer's benefit is correspondingly
extinguished, as is the rationale for the court's enforcement of the
discharge-for-cause policy."" Applying this logic, handbook
modification should be permissible, even on a unilateral basis, if the
employer also rescinds the source of its potential benefit.
The Bankey logic, however, does not necessarily extend to
handbook modifications as opposed to handbook revocations. Take,
82. Matthew W. Finkin, Shoring Up the Citadel (At-Will Employment), 24 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 1, 11-12 (2006) (citations omitted).
83. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 2.06 cmt. e.
84. 443 N.w.2d 112 (Mich. 1989).
85. Id. at 117.
86. Id. at 119.
87. Id.
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for example, the case of an employer that seeks to modify a policy
statement containing representations of job security through the
addition of a disclaimer. If the new document contains both specific
promises of job security as well as a disclaimer, the benefit to the
employer is not necessarily extinguished. In this instance, the
employees may conclude that the new handbook, read as a whole,
continues to offer a credible promise of job security." In this context,
as discussed above, a number of courts applying estoppel principles
would find a jury question as to the reasonable expectations
generated by the document's overall tenor.89
The likely retort from the drafters of section 2.06 to such
criticism is that the Bankey rationale is not the type of "equitable
estoppel" that they have in mind. As the comment notes, the
equitable estoppel basis for policy statement enforcement differs
from "contract principles of consideration, bargained-for exchange,
or even promissory estoppel."" Instead, the equitable estoppel basis
for enforcement likely refers to the "administrative agency estoppel"
concept discussed in the comment to section 2.05." Under that theory,
procedural rules promulgated by an administrative agency are
binding on the agency while in effect, but the agency may modify or
revoke those rules on a unilateral basis going forward subject only to
the provision of reasonable notice.
The analogy to administrative agency estoppel may be subject to
at least two criticisms in the context of employer policy statements.
First, no jurisdiction has adopted administrative agency estoppel as
the underlying rationale for enforcing employer policy statements. As
such, the Restatement seeks to change rather than to restate or clarify
existing law.
Second, it is not clear that the rules governing administrative
agency procedure are comparable in nature to the rules governing the
substance of the employment relationship. While a procedural rule in
an agency context serves to provide guidance on the process of how
an agency intends to determine substantive rights going into the
future, a promissory statement made in the context of an ongoing
employment relationship itself directly establishes the substantive
88. See Befort, supra note 1, at 377; Pratt, supra note 75, at 223.
89. See supra, notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
90. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 2.06 cmt. e (emphasis added).
91. See id. § 2.05 cmt. b.
92. See id.
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS AND POLICY STA TEMENTS
rules governing that relationship. In some employment contexts, such
as in the realm of procedural due process rights afforded by the
Constitution to public employees, an employer's unilaterally
promulgated rules and even practices have been found to be binding
and not subject to unilateral alteration." Further, promissory
employer policy statements frequently foster expectations about
future treatment. As Professor Finkin has stated in criticism of the
Restatement's analogy to administrative agency estoppel:
This logic elides the fact that the loyalty the employer's policy
sought to instill rested upon creating reasonable employee
expectations about how they will be treated in the future. The labor
of a human being is a non-durable good. The individual's dwindling
supply is expended, other opportunities ignored or foregone, at
least partly because of the expectation of fair treatment the
employer has engendered. If expectation of deferred income could
estop the employer from abrogating retroactively its commitment
to severance pay, it would seem much the same should apply in the
matter of job security; or, less strongly, that the [Restatement]
rather badly needs to explain why it would not, by reason other
than that abrogability betters serve an employer's interest.
IV. CONCLUSION
Restatement section 2.05 accurately chronicles the transformation
of employee handbooks and other policy statements during the 1980s
and 1990s from unenforceable gratuities to binding contracts in
appropriate circumstances. But that tells only half of the employee
handbook story. Since that time, employers have used disclaimers and
handbook modifications to transform these statements back into the
realm of the unenforceable. Unfortunately, the Restatement endorses
the legal principles that have made this second-act transformation
possible.
Section 2.05 appropriately urges that the binding nature of
employee handbooks should be a function of promises and benefits
rather than a fictionalized search for invisible handshakes. But the
Restatement fails to extend this more purposeful inquiry when the
focus turns to disclaimers and handbook modifications. The
Restatement instead gives determinative weight to the insertion of
93. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972).
94. Finkin, supra note 82, at 12.
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boilerplate disclaimers in new and revised handbooks without regard
to the overall promissory tenor of those documents or the reasonable
expectations they might create. Courts should not follow this
misguided advice.
